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Elite Theory versus Marxism:  
The Twentieth Century’s Verdict [2000] 
John Higley & Jan Pakulski  
Abstract: »Elitetheorie versus Marxismus. Lehren des 20. Jahrhunderts«. Not-
ing that Marxist and elite paradigms birthed competing theories on social and 
political change and that the differential development of these theories depends 
less on evidence than on ideological leanings, the epilogue to a collection of 
essays on postsocialist elites compares these paradigms in terms of their polari-
ty in the 20th century. Although fading by the end of the 19th century, Marx-
ism saw renewed vitality as it was embraced as a theoretical and ideological 
tool of radical and reformist leaders of the European Left. Elite theory’s de-
cline is attributed less to a lack of its plausibility than to a lack of ties to orga-
nized political forces. However, Marxism’s emergence as a major global intel-
lectual and political movement had a concomitant destructive impact on its 
explanatory power. By the end of the 20th century, Marxist theory comprised 
many dissipating streams. The decline of elite theory is delineated, noting that 
its tenets remained intact despite its unpopularity among activists and intellec-
tuals. The negative effect of fascism – i.e., the dubious notion that elite theory 
leads to fascism – is noted, along with the idea that a combination of socioeco-
nomic and sociocultural factors further eclipsed elite theory’s development and 
popularity. Latter-20th-century elite theory lacked urgency in discussions on 
Western democracies and non-Western developing countries. However, three 
trends led to the reinvigoration of elite theory: economic advances of Japan and 
the Asian tigers, state socialism in Eastern Europe, and the elite-driven Soviet 
collapse. Thus, political developments driving the revival of elite theory in-
clude the centrality of elite choices and actions guiding these changes; and the 
theoretical developments include the exhaustion of Marxist theory’s credibility 
and the reformulation of elite-centered democratic theory. Five suppositions 
underlying the analyses of contributions are delineated. 
Keywords: elites, Marxist analysis, political theories, paradigms, theoretical 
problems, twentieth century, class analysis. 
 
The Marxist and elite paradigms have always pointed toward starkly different – 
one may say mutually incompatible and fundamentally opposed – theories of 
political and social change. This polarity reflects the paradigms’ divergent 
philosophical roots, sociohistorical origins, and political functions. Marxism 
had strong Hegelian roots and it was deeply embedded in the radical tradition 
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of Utopian socialism; the elite paradigm was rooted in the neo-Kantian fact-
value distinction and it was firmly anchored in the positivist tradition. The 
Marxist paradigm was shaped by the new political order that gestated in the 
Vienna Peace of 1815 and then froze; the elite paradigm was the product of that 
order’s eventual collapse in the revolutionary upheavals sparked by socialist, 
communist, and fascist movements during the years surrounding World War I. 
Most important, Marxism claimed to be both the theoretical tool for unlocking 
history’s secrets and the ideological and political tool of a rising social force, 
the industrial proletariat; the elite paradigm had more modest explanatory aims 
and a much more somber tone, and it sought to ride no political horse. Its for-
mulators – Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and Max Weber – 
pursued a rigorous science of politics, and they dismissed and ridiculed the 
Marxist claim of revealing, not to mention shaping, history’s logic. 
In the Marxist paradigm, class membership influences all aspects of social 
and political life. Class divisions articulate themselves in social disparities and 
in conflicting norms, solidarities, identities, and political allegiances. Arising 
from fundamental economic relationships, classes are the principal actors on 
history’s stage, with all major social and political changes propelled by their 
struggles. This explanatory focus is supplemented by an eschatology that sees 
class conflicts as moving history toward a classless end when all people will 
enjoy a free, equal, and prosperous condition. In the elite paradigm, by con-
trast, tiny but powerful minorities are made up of autonomous social and politi-
cal actors who are interested primarily in maintaining and enhancing their 
power, so that their power struggles are not reducible to classes or other collec-
tivities. By holding that it is elite choices and power competitions, rather than 
economics and class-like collectivities, that shape political and to some extent 
wider social orders, format political and many social divisions; and enflame or 
contain major conflicts, the elite paradigm reverses Marxism’s causal arrow. 
As for eschatology, the Marxist vision of a classless society is replaced by a 
sobering projection of continuous – one is tempted to say “eternal” – elite 
circulations and struggles. 
These paradigmatic polarities have pervaded the assumptive and normative 
underpinnings of Marxist and elite theories of political and social change. Re-
garding politics as the outgrowth of economics, Marxist theory has depicted 
industrialization as diffusing power in a propertied ruling class and as heralding 
that class’s showdown with an ever larger and more self-conscious proletarian 
class. Elite theory, by contrast, stresses the autonomy of politics and the vital 
link between political power and bureaucratic organization, rather than proper-
ty. It denies that unorganized masses have the capacity to form a solidary class 
that could undertake politically and socially transforming actions. According to 
elite theory, all that can realistically be hoped for in an age of bureaucratic 
organization is effective rule by powerful, organizationally-based, self-
interested, but nonetheless responsive and responsible elites. 
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During the twentieth century, the confrontation between the Marxist and 
elite theories was only partly weakened or blurred by a third paradigm and set 
of theories. This third paradigm consisted of the more participatory and citizen-
oriented democratic precepts that derived principally from the liberal thought 
of Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill. But the democratic theories that 
emanated from these precepts have always had a more limited reach than the 
Marxist and elite theories. They have been concerned primarily with the foun-
dations and workings of mainly Western (especially Anglo-American) political 
systems during the twentieth century. Attempts to apply democratic theories to 
other parts of the world and other historical periods have focused on many 
phenomena: economic growth and market economies, middle classes, political 
cultures, civil societies, religious beliefs, political institutions, state autonomy, 
and foreign pressures. However, these applications have been vitiated by disa-
greements about the causal importance and interrelations of such diverse phe-
nomena. Moreover, claims that democratic theories have a global reach depend 
to an uncomfortable degree on assuming that the democratic politics of a score 
of Western countries, during some or all of the twentieth century, approximate 
the destination toward which the politics of all other countries are moving. Yet, 
the huge demographic, environmental, natural resource, and ethnonational 
barriers to such a worldwide democratizing trend, as well as the malfunctioning 
of Western democracies themselves, make this assumption dubious at best. 
Consequently, democratic theories have not achieved the explanatory force and 
scope of the Marxist and elite theories; they have served more as a normative 
vision than as an explanation of political and social change. 
Two points need stressing. First, the Marxist and elite paradigms gave birth 
to competing theories about how social and political change occurs and what is, 
therefore, possible. Second, the differential development of the Marxist and 
elite theories has depended less on evidence for and against them than on their 
ideological attractiveness, that is, their capacity to give normative and pro-
grammatic backbone to organized political forces. Let us briefly examine the 
twentieth-century fortunes of Marxist and elite theories in light of these points. 
Marxism’s Hard Twentieth-Century Road 
The plausibility of Marxist theory, with its strong emphasis on class formations 
and interests, was closely linked, as we have said, to conditions in nineteenth 
century Western Europe at a relatively early stage of industrialization: the 
spread of large factories in growing cities; the movement of impoverished 
peasants into urban ghettos and the disorders that resulted; the repressive Vien-
na Peace orchestrated by aristocratic and autocratic states that neither the bud-
ding socialist movements accompanying the industrial revolution nor the abor-
tive “Springtime of the Peoples” in 1848 managed to undermine. The 
plausibility of elite theories was linked to conditions in early twentieth-century 
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Western Europe at a more advanced stage of industrialization: the rapid growth 
of strong interventionist states; the rise of corporate bureaucracies, both public 
and private; the proliferation of charismatically led political mobilizations, 
especially of communist and fascist varieties; the emergence of powerful and 
manipulative mass communications media. 
Given the different conditions to which the Marxist and elite theories were 
linked, one would expect to observe a decline in the fortunes of Marxist theory 
during the twentieth-century age of étatism, national mobilizations, and totaliz-
ing wars. In fact, Marxism’s attractiveness began to fade as the nineteenth 
century neared its end. In the years immediately before and after World War I, 
however, it was embraced and reformulated as a theoretical and ideological 
tool of radical and reformist leaders of the European left – Communists, social-
ists, and social democrats alike.  
The elite theory adumbrated by Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and Weber also en-
joyed a brief period of popularity in those stormy early decades of the twentieth 
century. But the decisive factor shaping elite ‘s subsequent fortunes was less a 
decline in its plausibility than a lack of ties to organized political forces. Unlike 
Marxist theories, elite theory did not find a powerful “theory carrier” and it 
consequently went into a long eclipse. This happened, paradoxically enough, at 
a time when elite theory’s plausibility was probably greater than that of the 
reformulated Marxist theory. The “carrying” political factor was, thus, deci-
sive. Later, the defeat of fascism in World War II, in which the Soviet Union 
played a major part, gave a powerful boost to Marxist theory in continental 
Europe (though much less in the Anglo-American countries, whose liberal 
leaders and intellectuals claimed the primary credit for fascism’s defeat), and it 
enabled the European left to gain the high moral ground, especially in the uni-
versities. In addition, after World War II, Marxism became the ruling political 
formula in the Soviet-controlled state socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe; and it became a fashionable blueprint for economic, social, and politi-
cal development in emerging Third World countries. 
Twentieth-century political developments thus turned Marxism into a major 
worldwide intellectual and political movement. But the same developments had 
a devastating impact on Marxist theory’s explanatory power. Arraying the 
twentieth-century evidence for and against fifteen key hypotheses of Marxist 
theory, the American sociologist Richard F. Hamilton (1995) has found none of 
them confirmed, seven flatly disproved, and the other eight hypotheses receiv-
ing contingent, situation-specific support, but with their causal implications 
either problematic or rejected. Thus, the predicted showdown between a domi-
nant bourgeois class and a de-skilled, impoverished but ever-growing proleta-
riat did not eventuate, and proletarian revolution did not occur in any of the 
advanced capitalist countries where it was expected. In those countries, the 
petite bourgeoisie did not collapse into the proletariat but instead formed part 
of a growing and prosperous middle class, the dangerous lumpenproletariat 
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disappeared, and intellectuals, who were supposed to join and help lead the 
proletarian revolution, dispersed in all directions, not a few of them playing 
important roles in fascist movements and regimes aimed at arresting the spread 
of socialism. Concentration of private property, while great, stopped short of 
the predicted “monopoly” configuration. Likewise, the state’s autonomy and 
scope remained much greater than would be characteristic of a state that func-
tioned as an executive committee for managing the bourgeoisie’s common 
affairs. Mid-century corporatist deals paved the way for the incorporation of 
working-class parties into governments and for egalitarian reforms. Although 
economic crises punctuated the century, they did not display the cumulating 
intensity expected by Marxist theories, nor did nationalism wither in the face of 
international capitalism; rather, nationalism remained a dominant force that 
strongly shaped even the proletariat’s actions, most conspicuously during the 
century’s two world wars. 
At the twentieth century’s end, Marxist theory consisted of several dissipat-
ing streams (Pakulski and Waters, 1996). Its more orthodox streams had dege-
nerated into empirically confounded, vague, or highly dubious concepts and 
contentions. Its adjusted “critical” streams had fragmented and lost their dis-
tinctiveness. They appealed primarily to intellectuals who regarded capital-
ism’s market mechanisms with special distaste, and who, in spite of everything, 
continued to believe that a truly egalitarian society is somehow possible. To a 
considerable extent, Marxist theory’s adherents were confined to those who 
simply could not stomach an explanation of political change based on what was 
always the principal twentieth-century alternative: elite theory. 
The Eclipse of Elite Theory 
Political and social developments during the twentieth century left die tenets of 
elite theory comparatively unscathed, though they contributed to a precipitous 
decline in its popularity among political activists and intellectuals, and thus 
sent it into prolonged eclipse. During the 1920s, fascism’s demagogic appeals 
to nationalist and racist sentiments, which were used to justify the crushing of 
socialist forces, displaced the rationalistic rebuttal of Marxist theory that Mos-
ca, Pareto, Michels, and Weber had offered. Seizures of power and its undis-
guised concentration in small cliques of fanatical leaders led to elite circula-
tions in Italy, Germany, Austria, several countries of Eastern Europe, and, to a 
lesser extent, Spain, Japan, and some countries of Latin America. While it is 
doubtful that the early elite theorists accurately predicted the rise of fascist 
elites, there was nothing about this rise that was inconsistent with the theorists’ 
emphasis on the inescapability of elite domination, the forms this can take, and 
the inexorable circulation of elites. 
The ugliness of fascism and its threat to Western civilization sobered many 
persons who had blithely regarded the gradual progression of Western coun-
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tries toward a vague socialist condition as unproblematic. To a limited degree, 
the rise of fascist elites rekindled interest in elite theory (for example, Mann-
heim, 1940; Burnham, 1943; Lasswell and Lerner, 1965). Overwhelmingly, 
however, the revulsion against fascism translated into a strong reaffirmation of 
democratic beliefs, so that the explanation for fascism was mainly sought in 
other directions: as lower-middle-class extremism reinforced by authoritarian 
tendencies among working classes (Lipset, 1960); as the product of an “autho-
ritarian personality” syndrome (Fromm, 1941; Adorno et al., 1950); as the 
result of an antidemocratic stream in European philosophy (Arendt, 1951); or 
as the consequence of mass society (Kornhauser, 1959). Indeed, without con-
vincing reasons being given, some came to view elite theory itself as leading to 
fascism (for example, Beetham, 1977). 
In the euphoria that attended the fascist powers’ defeat in 1945 and during 
the two halcyon decades of sustained economic growth that began a few years 
later in the most advanced Western countries, elite theory went into deeper 
eclipse. Pareto, Mosca, and Michels fell into a disciplinary no-man’s-land 
between political science and sociology, being relegated by each field to the 
status of minor figures (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993). Weber’s legacy was reinter-
preted in the sociological tradition as a corrective to, rather than a confrontation 
with, Marxist theory, and the elite-centered theses in his work remained under-
developed, subsumed under the headings of “charisma” and “bureaucracy.” 
More important, influential parts of the academic and intellectual establish-
ments – especially the liberal left in America and democratic socialists in 
Western Europe – condemned elite theory as inherently conservative, simplis-
tic, and antidemocratic (see, for example, Bachrach, 1967; Beetham, 1977). 
It was not that scholars and intellectuals were unaware of elites and their 
role in social and political change. Rather, a combination of socioeconomic and 
sociocultural conditions hindered the development and restricted the popularity 
of elite theory. It was Marxist theory’s diluted and diverse streams that pro-
vided the idioms for intellectuals who were critical of liberal democracy’s 
shortcomings. This was partly a matter of preemption because, as noted, Marx-
ist theorizing emerged from the horrors of World War II wearing an anti-fascist 
mantle, and it had powerful carriers in the form of large Communist, socialist, 
and social democratic parties. The popularity of Marxist theory was also partly 
the result of terminological adjustments made to it by the New Left during the 
1950s and 1960s. And, finally, its popularity was in part a consequence of elite 
theory’s perceived guilt-by-association with fascism. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, moreover, the postwar period was marked by 
exceptionally promising conditions. Economic growth and the consolidation of 
welfare states enabled governing elites to avoid hard choices and to placate 
discontented groups with subventions and other seemingly cost-free redistribu-
tive measures (Field and Higley, 1980, 1986). A belief that the welfare state 
was perhaps the final solution to major social conflicts and problems became 
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widespread (see, for example, Tingsten, 1955; Myrdal, 1960; Briggs, 1961; 
Beer, 1965). Many commented on how domestic issues were being reduced to 
discussions between bureaucrats and experts, and how the function of political 
leaders was more and more that of shaping and selling to mass electorates the 
justifications for specific policies that bureaucrats and experts produced (for 
example, Meynaud, 1965; Thoenes, 1966). Steady economic growth and wel-
fare state expansions increased social mobility from a variety of non-elite sta-
tuses to elite positions. Many newly arrived elite persons consequently tended 
to see themselves as identified with the social categories from which they 
hailed and in which they continued to have close personal ties. 
All this made elites seem less socially and politically distinct, less threaten-
ing to and more empathetic with mass populations. As a result, the global and 
historical reach of elite theory was largely ignored, the elite concept was sel-
dom employed in public and scholarly discourse in other than a pejorative way, 
and a view of elites (often dubbed “policymakers,” “decision makers,” or just 
“opinion leaders”) as a relatively prosaic aspect of the democratic landscape 
prevailed. Within social science circles, this view was reinforced by the ascen-
dancy of survey and other quantitative research methods better suited to inves-
tigating mass attitudes and behaviors than to studying the dissembling political 
opinions, secretive behaviors, and situationally contingent actions of elites. 
What passed for elite theory during the twentieth century’s third quarter 
was, therefore, a protracted discussion, which exhibited little urgency, about 
the roles of elites in Western democratic political systems. This discussion 
centered on the modifications of classical democratic theory made principally 
by Joseph Schumpeter (1941), Raymond Aron (1950), Giovanni Sartori (1965), 
and Robert Dahl (1971). The discussion is familiar and well reviewed else-
where (Parry, 1969; Putnam, 1976; Sartori, 1987), so it is enough to say here 
that thinking about elites was sidetracked onto a set of essentially empirical 
questions about their existence, social composition, and policy attitudes at 
community and national levels in democracies. Were there elites at all? If so, as 
C. Wright Mills (1956), Robert Dahl (1960), Arnold Rose (1967), and many 
other (mainly American) scholars asked, were they of a “power” or a “plural” 
kind? To what extent was elite social composition unrepresentative of the wid-
er citizenry? How did research methods used to study elites shape the answers 
to these questions? These were a-theoretical matters because they seldom 
linked elites to basic patterns of political change or continuity, they were ex-
plored in an historical and comparative void, and they were mainly concerned 
with measuring trivial correlates of elite status (Zuckerman, 1977). 
Nor did elite theory fare any better when discussion turned to the politics of 
non-Western developing countries. Many political adventurers in those coun-
tries were strongly attracted to Marxist theory because they could use it to 
justify their revolutionary seizure and wielding of government power. Elite 
theory’s denial of the Marxist program and its emphasis on the inevitability of 
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elite domination were hardly useful to such adventurers. Although it was clear 
to Westerners who looked at them that all developing countries were dominat-
ed by elites, most of which were internally divided, thoroughly corrupt, prone 
to violent struggles, and, hence, incapable of operating democratic regimes, this 
tended to be seen as a temporary problem that Western example and aid would 
in time overcome. Even when, in the 1970s, the failure of most developing 
countries to move in democratic directions became so apparent as to require 
explanation, the strong tendency was to seek answers in Marxist notions of 
dependency and the workings of a capitalist world-system (for example, Wal-
lerstein, 1974). 
The End of Elite Theory Eclipse 
Three major trends during the twentieth century’s final two decades forced 
more serious consideration of elites. The first trend was the economic advances 
of Japan and the “Asian Tiger” countries. These advances occurred against the 
predictions of dependency theorists and, until the late 1990s, without the recur-
ring economic depressions that Marxist theory prophesied for capitalist coun-
tries. The Asian successes involved tutelage and reforms from above carried 
out by strong state elites (Johnson, 1982; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 
1985; Kataoka, 1998). The economic performances of Japan and the Tigers 
thus helped to revive interest in elites and their role in fostering economic 
development. The political liberalizations that were eventually initiated by 
elites in Korea and Taiwan, and the ways in which elites managed the two 
countries’ transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, heightened this 
interest (Higley, Huang, and Lin, 1998). 
The second elite-centered trend unfolded among the state socialist countries 
of Eastern Europe. As the early elite theorists had anticipated, state socialist 
regimes testified strongly to the centrality of elites. Once such regimes were 
consolidated in Yugoslavia, Albania, Central and Eastern Europe, China, North 
Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam, it became less easy to view the dominance of ruth-
less party elites, such as the Soviet Union had experienced under Stalin, as 
merely a transitional or aberrant condition. Rather, it was obvious that revolu-
tion and military conquest in these countries had led only to a circulation of 
elites, with the new state socialist elites being more thoroughly entrenched than 
those they displaced. The extreme longevity of elite tenures under state social-
ism, the repression of all competing elites, and the fiasco of Mao’s ostensible 
effort to combat elite entrenchment through “cultural revolution” were striking-
ly consistent with elite theory. 
This did not escape the attention of some scholars in the state socialist coun-
tries. But in seeking to use elite theory to illuminate power relations in their 
countries, these scholars confronted difficult political-ideological and censor-
ship restrictions. They accordingly embraced elite theory by stealth, under the 
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label of “developed class analysis,” studies of “political-ideological leader-
ship,” the “new class,” and, in one case, a survey of national “opinion leaders” 
in state socialist Yugoslavia (Barton, Denitch, and Kadushin, 1973). One of the 
authors of chapter 5 in this volume, Polish sociologist Wlodzimierz Wesolows-
ki (1977), drew a clear theoretical distinction between Marxian economic class 
divisions and elite-mass relations. He argued that the political elite in state 
socialist countries like Poland should be viewed as autonomous from the domi-
nant class in its articulations, actions, and general social functions. Among 
Western students of the state socialist countries, elite-centered analyses formed 
the scholarly mainstream, even if they were conducted with little reference to 
classical elite theory. In this enterprise, typologies of elites more complex than 
those offered by the early elite theorists were constructed, the organization and 
dynamics of elite-mass relations were studied, and close attention was given to 
the political effects of elite successions in the state socialist countries (for ex-
ample, Beck 1973; Welsh, 1979; Bunce, 1981; Lane, 1988; Brown, 1989). 
One may view these scholarly developments as an ultimate historical irony. 
The triumph of Marxist-inspired politics in the state socialist countries contri-
buted to the waning of Marxist theory by generating social and political confi-
gurations clearly at odds with its tenets and very much in line with the predic-
tions of its most ardent critics, the original elite theorists. The Soviet Union’s 
demise between 1989 and 1991 further attested to the relevance of elite theory. 
It was driven by elite conflicts and elite-imposed reforms that, in turn, opened a 
window of opportunity for reformist elites in the Soviet satellite countries, 
backed in a few instances by sudden mass mobilizations (Higley and Pakulski, 
1993, 1995; Tokes, 1996; Lane, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Hough, 1997; 
Kotz and Weir, 1997). As earlier and elsewhere during the twentieth century, 
the rise and fall of state socialism was in largest measure a story of elite strug-
gles, circulations, and failures. 
The elite-driven demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes consti-
tuted an especially dramatic category in the “third wave” of transitions from 
authoritarian to putatively democratic regimes that coincided with the twentieth 
century’s final quarter (Huntington, 1991). This was the third major trend that 
helped end elite theory’s long eclipse. In the extensive literature studying the 
third wave transitions, the calculations and actions of elites figure on nearly 
every page. Summarizing more than two dozen such studies carried out under 
their direction, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset 
(1995:19) observed that “Time and again across our cases we find the values, 
goals, skills, and styles of political leaders and elites making a difference in the 
fate of democracy.” Samuel P. Huntington’s (1991) comprehensive analysis of 
thirty-five third wave countries highlighted the interplay among political elites 
in the courses and outcomes of democratic transitions. Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan’s (1996) rigorous analyses of the democratic transition paths taken by 
thirteen Southern European, South American, and East European countries 
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between 1974 and 1991 showed the decisive importance of relatively uncon-
strained choices made by elites during those transitions. 
In sum, a mixture of political and theoretical developments revived interest 
in elite theory during the twentieth century’s last decades. The main political 
developments were the obvious centrality of elite choices and actions in guid-
ing the spectacular economic and political changes in Asian societies, in foster-
ing but also managing the collapse of state socialism, and in shaping many of 
the other regime transitions in democratization’s third wave. Principal theoreti-
cal developments were the exhaustion of Marxist theory’s credibility and the 
reformulation of democratic theory in a more elite-centered direction (for ex-
ample, Sartori, 1987; Zolo, 1991). 
Elite Theory in the New Century 
The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by the birth of elite theory, 
and, after the circuitous route we have summarized, the century ended with a 
marked return to the discussion of elites. References to elites are today ubiquit-
ous in political discourse. Journalists and commentators speak regularly about 
elites when dissecting events in Washington and Moscow, Belgrade and Bei-
jing. Social scientists and historians regularly assign elites pivotal roles when 
analyzing political regimes, revolutions, social movements, democratic transi-
tions and consolidations. Elites are at the core of the emphasis on “political” 
causation that is now so prevalent in macro political analysis, even though 
many scholars continue to use synonyms such as leaders, rulers, power groups, 
power networks, and state actors. 
The discussion of elites is once again in vogue. As yet, however, elite theory 
has not been renewed. Scholars have not followed up on the attempts of Mosca, 
Pareto, Michels, and, in his own way, Weber to make elites the centerpiece in 
theories of political and social change. Consequently, the many who today 
focus on elites in their analyses do so in something like a theory void because 
there is no well-accepted body of definitions, interrelated concepts, and propo-
sitions guiding their focus. “The elitist paradigm,” George Moyser and Marga-
ret Wagstaffe have observed,  
suffers from argument and confusion over key terms, a relative dearth of test-
able hypotheses, a failure clearly to separate normative from empirical theory 
and, not least, the lack of a firm data base in which the latter could be solidly 
grounded (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987: 1). 
This book has tried to address some of these problems, but it is obvious that 
much remains to be done. The kinds of overall elite configurations that exist 
among contemporary societies, the means by which transformations from one 
configuration to another occur, the limits that mass publics place on elite ac-
tions, and the examination of what is, therefore, possible in the political world 
of the twenty-first century demand better theory and analysis. These are com-
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plex and difficult issues. In concluding, we can only list some of the supposi-
tions that underlie the theories and analyses presented in this book and that, we 
believe, must inform further thinking and research if elite theory is to be re-
newed. Stated in their baldest form, these suppositions are: 
- The internal workings, commitments, and patterned actions of elites con-
stitute the basic distinctions to be made among the political systems of all 
independent countries. 
- The extent to which elites do or do not trust and cooperate with each oth-
er is logically and factually prior to constitutional and other institutional 
arrangements, to the existence of political stability or instability, and to 
any serious degree of democratic politics. 
- The existence and centrality of elites make all Utopias impossible to 
achieve; major political and social changes stem mainly from basic trans-
formations of elites. 
- Elite transformations take place within, and are somewhat limited by, 
wide parameters that are set by the political dispositions and orientations 
of mass populations; to this extent, the relation between elites and mass 
publics is interdependent. 
- At the end of the day, basic choices in politics pertain mainly to the desi-
rability of some kinds of elite configurations over others, and to the wis-
dom, in any concrete situation, of trying to modify or transform an exist-
ing elite configuration. 
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